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3 Indeed, the US economic crisis was over by 2010, although recovery was slow as firms and households deleveraged and there were fears of a double-dip recession.
In 2010-12 public finance crises resulted from large bail-out or stimulus packages, exacerbated by falling taxes due to recession (as in Ireland, USA, or the UK). If central banks are committed to low inflation, then increased budget deficits mean larger public debts and potential sovereign debt crises. However, at the time of writing governments of these 1 The author is grateful for very helpful comments from James Riedel and Marek Dabrowski. 2 Many large banks suffered losses on "toxic" assets issued by US and UK financial institutions, but these losses were not sufficient to cause crises. In contrast to the situation after July 1997, when investors questioning the creditworthiness of foreign issuers found some large countries' debts unpalatable (notably Russia and later Argentina), there was no such discovery after September 2008. 3 Eichengreen (2011, provides references, and discusses the difficulty of determining the counterfactual with which to compare the aftermath of financial crises. Giles et al. (2012) countries appeared to be taking adequate measures to maintain sovereign creditworthiness.
At the same time, and to some extent coincidentally, other sovereign debt crises occurred, most notably in Greece due to cumulating budget deficits fuelled by cheap debt since joining the euro. 
The North Atlantic Financial Crisis of 2007-8
The billion bail-out for GMAC, the car-loan arm of General Motors. Over the following year the US and EU economies would experience a deep recession, whose impact would be transmitted to the rest of the world through reduced demand for imports.
The Global Economic Crisis of 2009
In 2008 average growth in the high-income countries had slowed to a standstill and in 2009 their GDP fell by 3.5 percent ( Table 1 ). The decline was driven by the recessions in the USA and UK and was transmitted through reduced demand for imports, which first hit countries exporting consumer durables whose purchase could be postponed, e.g. car exporters in Japan, Germany and France. Table A9 ). In sum, the financial crisis was not global, but, when two of 6 This contributed to falling share prices. The world's stock markets fell by about a third in the final quarter of 2008, in many countries continuing to decline to a trough in the first or second quarter of 2009, which added to the negative wealth effect on aggregate demand. 7 Alessandria et al. (2010; show that sales of foreign cars began to decline in the USA in mid-2008 and the ratio of inventories to sales increased by 45 percent over the next six months. Car sales began to revive in early 2009, but imports only picked up after inventories had been run down. In 2010 the car cycle benefited especially Germany whose carmakers had competitive model ranges. 8 Some authors saw a direct link between the financial crises and the decline in trade. Ahn, Amiti, and Weinstein (2011) claim that financial factors may explain about 20 to 30 percent of the decline in world trade that occurred in the 2008-2009 crisis, and they support this claim by showing that the prices of manufactured exports rose relative to domestic prices during the crisis and that U.S. seaborne exports and imports, which they assume to be more sensitive to trade finance problems, saw their prices rise relative to goods shipped by air or land. Others have argued that trade finance was not a major contributor to reduced trade volume in 2008-9. One difficulty is the lack of hard data on trade finance (Korinek, Le Cocguic and Sourdin, 2010 A noteworthy pattern was that emerging market economies as a group weathered the storm better than the high-income countries. Several authors confirm that GDP growth declined less in emerging economies, even after controlling for several variables (Frankel and Saravelos, 2010; Rose and Spiegel, 2010; Rose, 2011) . Didier et al. (2011) argue that, using the drop from pre-crisis highs as the criterion, there is no significant difference between high-income and emerging economies, but they acknowledge that emerging economies recovered faster and as a group had returned to pre-crisis levels of industrial output in 2010, whereas high-income countries did not achieve this until 2011. A superior recovery was evident in the large emerging economies with sound economic policies before the crisis, such as China, India, Brazil and Indonesia.
Why did emerging economies ride out the crisis so calmly? They were open economies and hence exposed to sharp drops in export demand. However, trade shocks typically are shorter-lasting than financial crises, which may be followed by a lengthy period of deleveraging and domestic recession. Moreover, and in contrast to earlier decades, many emerging economies had shifted from being net external debtors to net creditors and held liquid foreign assets (e.g. in the form of reserve assets) and illiquid foreign liabilities (e.g. as direct foreign investment), so they were not exposed to a sudden deterioration in the capital account of the balance of payments. Finally, some countries, notably China, introduced preemptive stimulus packages to prevent the initial negative shock from turning into a major recession. 
Public Finance Crises
By 2010 all regions of the world were enjoying positive economic growth. However, the sense of crisis persisted as a number of countries experienced difficulties reducing their public sector deficit and ran into debt problems. Some of these debt crises were related to the financial crisis in cases where governments had been involved in expensive bail-outs (e.g. Ireland or Iceland) and others to the size of the stimulus packages adopted to deal with the economic crisis (e.g. the USA and UK), while other debt crises were essentially independent of the financial and economic crises but came at a bad time (e.g. Greece).
In 2010-11, public sector budget crises were debt crises because all governments were committed to not monetizing budget deficits. This was, of course, not an option for individual eurozone countries (or for countries like Latvia which remained committed to a fixed exchange rate), but neither the USA, nor the UK nor the ECB appeared to be contemplating the inflation option.
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The US, UK and eurozone central banks sought to expand the 10 Warnings by the US government of systemic risk and a new Great Depression contributed to global uncertainty (Taylor, 2009) . The media working out of the northeastern USA and London, spooked by the dramatic US and UK financial collapses in September and October 2008, may have contributed to panic among policymakers in late 2008, even in countries which experienced no financial crisis such as Australia or China. 11 Iceland, with a population of just over 300,000 was small enough to be a special case (Benediktsdottir et al., 2011) . In the last quarter of 2008 the three major banks went into receivership and at year's end the external debt to GDP ratio was around 1000%. The government guaranteed deposits held in Iceland, but not deposits held elsewhere, and introduced capital controls to insulate the economy, while allowing the currency to depreciate by 50%. This policy combination led to a reasonably soft landing given the size of the debt, but the capital controls probably contravened the country's obligations as a member of the European Economic Area and by a larger economy the external defaults would have been sufficiently unacceptable to have triggered retaliation. Moreover, the recovery in the BOP was helped by increased aluminium exports (26% of Iceland's exports in 2010), which monetary base sufficiently to accommodate deleveraging without fuelling inflation, so far with reasonable success. 12 The specifics of the fiscal tightening required to reduce debt burdens were politically controversial, but there was little question of its necessity. By 2011, the countries that had run up debts while stimulating their economies during financial crises appeared to be largely on track, and fears of default (or even of further downgrades of these countries' credit ratings) had diminished by the year's end.
The eurozone sovereign debt crises had varying origins. The Irish government made one foolish policy decision, guaranteeing all creditors of the major Irish banks and had to pay a large price for that error. 13 The Spanish economy had experienced a construction bubble in some respects like that of the other Atlantic crisis economies and, although concerns were raised about it being one of the indebted PIIGS, Spain's debt/GDP ratio was not exceptionally high (Table 2 ). Italy had a much higher debt/GDP ratio, indeed the highest in the eurozone in 2007, but this was inherited from poor public finance management in the 1990s rather than something that emerged in the 2000s. The Greek debt differed in that it had mushroomed after adoption of the euro and the use of the borrowed funds was opaque.
14 was due to increased capacity in preceding years rather than to currency depreciation (Darvas, 2011, 22) , and the $2 billion IMF package was supplemented with $3 billion from Nordic countries (Gylfason, 2011, 2) . 12 In 2008 the monetary base (notes and coins plus reserves held with the central bank) was 4-6% of GDP in the US and UK and 10% in the eurozone. By early 2012 the ratio had increased to 16-18% in all three, but the increase in the money supply (M2) was much smaller because banks used easier access to central bank funds to improve their capital ratios rather than for loans to the private sector. The US Fed was the most successful in 2010-11 in stimulating easier private sector credit without an inflationary surge and notably refrained from further quantitative easing in the first quarter of 2012. The ECB was the least successful in moderating the economic slowdown, and hence became the most active in providing liquidity to banks in the first quarter of 2012. 13 This was a choice. The Icelandic government pointedly refused to guarantee foreign deposits in Icelandic banks that went under, and stuck to this position despite heavy pressure from the UK and Netherlands in both of which subsidiaries of Icelandic banks had attracted large numbers of depositors. Whelan (2011) argues that the Irish economy already faced serious problems in 2007-8 after a real estate bubble had burst, which made it even more incredible that the government on 30 September 2008 announced a near-blanket guarantee to the creditors of Irish banks. When Allied Irish Bank's losses were assessed at €30 billion in September 2010 and the government issued promissory notes to cover the bank's debts, Ireland's budget deficit reached 32% of GDP. By spring 2011 the total bill to Irish taxpayers for bank bailouts had exceeded €70 billion, for a country of less than 4.5 million people.
14 Greece had accumulated a substantial debt since the early 1980s, but high and increasing interest rates on drachma-denominated debt would have forced a much earlier reckoning had Greece not adopted the euro. Low global interest rates due to major central banks' expansionary monetary policies facilitated debt accumulation by many countries in the early 2000s, but for Greece the impact was magnified by the absence of country risk premia. With lenders only requiring standard eurozone interest rates in the 2000s (Figure 1 ), Greece's day of reckoning was postponed by many years. The adoption of the euro led to rapid convergence of interest rates on debt issued or guaranteed by eurozone member governments, and between 2001 and 2008 these rates were practically identical (Figure 1 ). After adopting the euro the Greek government) "went on a borrowing spree at artificially low interest rates" (Sally, 2012) to finance non-transparent budget deficits, including for prestige projects like the 2004 Olympic Games.
15
A Greek default was a potential contagion event for two reasons. First, it sounded a warning to creditors that they should check whether other eurozone countries had been borrowing heavily on the basis of low interest rates which ignored individual countries' default risk; they found Portugal, which like Greece had been running large current account deficits since introducing the euro (Table 3) .
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Figure 1. Interest Rates on Eurozone Sovereign Debt, 1989-2011
15 Some of the non-transparency was due to fraudulent presentation of macro data, while some was expenses ballooning out of control. The original budget for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games was $1.6 billion, but actual spending is believed to have exceeded $16 billion and, while this was not unique (the public debt from the 1976 Montréal Olympics was only paid off in 2005), in Greece's case it added to a debt that was already passing beyond hope of repayment. 16 The argument here is not that a current account deficit is necessarily a problem, but that it did provide an indicator of the size of net capital inflows and this magnitude may be a cause for concern. (Tables  A11  and  A12) , at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/tables.pdf (accessed 9 September 2011). Notes: Eurozone calculated as the sum of the balances of individual eurozone countries excluding Estonia.
A second source of contagion arose because banks in other eurozone countries held large amounts of the sovereign debt or, equally disastrous, loans to Greek banks that would go under if the Greek government defaulted. This was especially true for banks in EU countries, such as France and Germany, which had not been involved in pre-2008 real estate lending to the same extent as banks in Spain, Ireland or the UK. The French and German banks weathered the 2008 financial storm better, but in 2010 found themselves over-exposed to Greek borrowers. Thus, EU leaders, with the French President and German Chancellor in the vanguard, spent much energy in 2010 and 2011 organizing relief for Greece, ideally to avoid default but at a minimum to buy time so that foreign banks and others could reorganize their balance sheets before they had to write down the value of their Greek assets. Another apparent dilemma was that countries more integrated into the global economy or with more liberal financial sectors were likely to be hit the hardest, whereas countries outside the global economy were insulated from the crises. This is, however, not an argument for autarchy or financial reregulation. Countries with more liberal financial sectors enjoyed superior growth in the decades before 2007, which far exceeded the size of the decline in GDP in 2008 -9 (Pomfret, 2010 ; Table 4 provides some comparisons. The gains from financial liberalization are primarily in terms of improved allocation of capital rather than increased saving and investment, as evidenced from financially repressed economies in the twentieth century 19 and also in recent empirical work based on a broader range of countries to default. Legally, however, the semantics matter because many institutions are barred from holding assets whose issuer is in default. The March 2012 rescheduling of Greek debt was not labelled "default" because formal default would force pension funds and others to hold a fire sale of assets, but it was a "credit event" which triggered payments to creditors who held credit-default swaps (CDSs) as insurance against their Greek bonds turning into bad debts. 18 There may also be a psychological issue, if policymakers who laboured to avoid formal Greek default in 2010-12 do not want default to happen on their watch. President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel may have continued to organize aid packages beyond the point at which new leaders would be ready to draw a line (and blame their predecessors for failing to recognize Greek insolvency sooner). As Dean (2012) points out, already in early 2010 it was known that Greece was insolvent, and for most economists the sensible policy would have been a quick write off, whose wider impact would have been trivial given that the Greek economy is smaller than that of Greater Miami. 19 Countries that repressed their financial sectors during the 1950s and 1960s import-substitution era suffered negative consequences for long-term economic growth; there was little loss of savings because the interest elasticity of supply of saving is low, but excess demand for loans at low interest rates was associated with misallocation of capital (Fry, 1988) . In countries like India or the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s inefficient (Kukenova, 2011; Buera et al., 2011) . These benefits tend to be more pronounced in the longer term, although financial liberalization inevitably exposes an economy to greater volatility.
The less dynamic EU financial sectors, notably those of France and Germany, did not stoke real estate bubbles in the first decade of the twenty-first century, but instead they took the conservative path of lending to European governments or to borrowers assumed to have sovereign backing. The French and German banks that took this path failed to recognize that eurozone sovereigns' creditworthiness differed and that some governments might irresponsibly borrow beyond hope of repayment. The most positive outcome, from an early 2012 perspective, would be if this characterization only applied to Greece, but even for an economy as small as that of Greece debt resolution is dragging out. The Greek debt crisis differed from the 2007-8 crises in which private borrowers defaulted, financial institutions collapsed and the government had to accept the cost of a bankrupt institution (like Lehmann) or of nationalizing (the UK) or bailing out (the USA) financial institutions. The latter costs quickly appeared on public sector balance sheets. The size of the increased public debt was known, and responsibility accepted. On a political level, the population recognized the need for policies to maintain public sector creditworthiness, even if the government that had accumulated the debt was thrown out (as in Ireland) or the prime minister was formally charged and tried for incompetence (Iceland). 20 allocation of capital was indicated by increasing incremental capital-output ratios (ICORs). India's ICOR increased from 4-4.5 in the first half of the 1960s to a peak of 10.5 in 1975 (reported in the Asian Development Bank's Asian Economic Outlook 1990, p. 138), i.e. an additional unit of capital made less than half the contribution to output in 1976 than it had made a dozen years earlier. In the Soviet Union the ICOR increased from 3.7 in the period 1950 -60, to 5.0 in 1960 -75 and 14.8 in 1975 -85 (Gregory, 1994 . Countries with well-functioning financial sectors typically have ICORs that remain in the 3-4 range. 20 Darvas (2012) describes how three of the countries with the highest debt/GDP ratios (Iceland, Ireland and Latvia) adopted a variety of drastic measures, and in each case reduced the debt successfully.
By contrast, Greece was kept technically solvent and the main lending banks neither folded nor were nationalized, so the Greek debt crisis dragged on with ongoing uncertainty about the eventual costs to public and private balance sheets and about the systemic outcome.
The likelihood is that such uncertainty will delay resolution of the regional imbalances in Table 3 and a return to sustained economic growth in the eurozone, as leaders continue to argue over who bears the cost of debt resolution and over long-term systemic reform within the eurozone. Moreover, unlike the cases described in the previous paragraph, a lengthy resolution process may erode the population's willingness to accept responsibility for accumulating the past debt and contribute to a tendency to blame external actors (the IMF or leaders of other EU countries) for imposing harsh policies on the country. By the March 2012 agreement, Greece has already defaulted on a large portion of its debt, but the debt/GDP ratio remains high and disagreement over "blame" will complicate further resolution. Meanwhile, EU leaders focus on designing pre-emptive measures to prevent recurring debt crises due to eurozone members accumulating unsustainable debts.
In sum the public financial crises that emerged in 2010 had two different complexions.
Those that arose from the financial crises of 2008 have been tackled -more purposively by the smaller economies concerned, and less purposively by the USA and UK which being without original sin (i.e. not having debts denominated in a foreign currency) can, in the last resort, reduce their real debt by inflation. The debts accumulated by eurozone members, which over-borrowed on the basis of low interest rates fuelled by banks' foolish misconception that all eurozone sovereign debt was equal, are being resolved by drawn-out political negotiations whose endpoint is uncertain. 21 The eurozone crisis could have global implications, if the problem is not restricted to the small economies of Greece and Portugal, but more certainly it is a European problem distracting EU economic policymakers from global issues. 21 Article 125 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union prohibits any direct bailout of member states, but especially in March 2012 this appeared to be being subverted by the ECB providing indirect bail-out funds via increased liquidity for banks which were being pressured to write down their Greek loans (Dabrowski, 2011, 31) . Commentators, especially in Germany, became increasingly concerned about the potential impact on inflation, e.g. on 26 February 2012 Welt am Sonntag carried the front-page headline "Europa ertrinkt im Geld" (Europe is drowning in money) and a four-page report detailing the ECB's out-of-control money creation. As long as Sarkozy and Merkel remain in power, however, there is unlikely to be admission of policy error in handling the Greek crisis in 2010-11 or acceptance of the fact that sovereign default is not incompatible with continued use of the common currency (e.g. many countries defaulted before 1914 and remained on the gold standard, and US states and cities have defaulted without leaving the dollar-zone).
The Post-2007 Crises beyond the North Atlantic
There was no significant financial crisis in Asia (except Kazakhstan, and that was largely home-grown), Latin America, Africa or Australasia. There was an economic crisis in 2009 as global demand fell, but outside the USA and EU recovery was relatively rapid and emerging economies' share in world trade continued to increase. There are no public finance crises, as in the USA and Europe, although some governments undertook large prophylactic stimulus packages (e.g. China and Australia), 22 and some faced independent shocks (notably Japan's natural disaster in March 2011). 23 These are ad hoc and need not be longterm negatives (although they could turn out to be negative if the monies were poorly used or if returning to prudent budgets is difficult). (Table 5) .
An important reason for
By 2010 China and Japan were the largest holders of US Treasury securities, with over two trillion dollars between them, and South Korea and Taiwan also held large amounts of US government debt. The desirability of monetary stability to facilitate trade was, however, 22 China's stimulus program introduced in 2008Q4 included RMB 1.18 trillion in central government funding, but more importantly it unleashed massive spending from sub-national governments much of which was funded by local investment corporations (difang zhengfu rongzi pingtai) whose activities are often non-transparent. LICs had been successful in promoting growth, e.g. in Shanghai which had provided the inspiration for the model, but before 2009 they tried to maintain a low profile. The stimulus announcement released any perceived political constraints on the LICs' scale of activities, and in 2009 the actual gross stimulus from all levels of government reached about a fifth of GDP (Wong, 2011) . Many of these loans had a three-year maturity, and in March 2012 the central government instructed lenders to roll them over; the London Financial Times (13 February 2012, page 1) reported that the debt of provinces and cities was equivalent to $1.7 trillion or about a quarter of Chinese GDP. 23 The Japanese central government approved 14.3 trillion yen ($175 billion) in extra expenditures for recovery from the disaster that killed 19,000 people and made 325,000 homeless and caused huge environmental and property damage. 24 The 2000 Chiang Mai Initiative, a swap arrangement among the ASEAN+3 group (the ten ASEAN members plus China, Japan and South Korea), was expanded and multilateralized in 2009, but the amounts remained small compared to, say, the credit lines some of the participants had with the US Fed and the facility proved to be redundant during the 2008-9 crises (Pomfret, 2011, 58-73 (Table  A15) Since 2000 Asian economic integration has centred on a network of bilateral trade agreements, especially in East Asia. This has been driven by the increased density of regional value chains, and perhaps by lack of progress on trade facilitation in the Doha Development Round (Pomfret, 2011; Orefice and Rocha, 2011; Xing, 2011; Sourdin and Pomfret, 2012) . A consequence of the value chains is that the extent of the decline of global trade, which is measured by summing gross value at each border crossing, relative to the decline in GDP, which is measured by summing value-added, was exaggerated. trillion, while ASEAN has a combined GDP of over $1.5 trillion.
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In sum, East Asia did not suffer a major crisis in 2008-9 -certainly nowhere near as bad as that of 1997-8 -and the reasons are sound. 27 Creation of deeper domestic financial markets, avoidance of large balance of payments or public sector deficits, outward-oriented trade policies and specialization by comparative advantage are all part of a recipe for continued economic growth. Such growth will narrow the income gap between East Asia and the USA and European countries that continue to experience deleveraging and slow growth.
Implications for Global Economic Governance
The major shift in global economic weight described in the previous section poses challenges to the system of multilateral institutions established in the 1940s and other fora for global economic governance. The G7/G8 grouping has been challenged by the rise of the G20, which includes six Asian economies (not counting Russia): Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea. However, despite dissatisfaction in Asia, the IMF and World Bank Finally, EU assumptions that the Asian economic powers will be concerned by their eurozone woes and may help out financially are likely to be misplaced. China has diversified its foreign exchange holdings and is hence concerned about the value of the euro. 30 However, Chinese 28 Asian regional agreements in the 1990s and 2000s are described and analysed in Pomfret (2011) . Pomfret and Sourdin (2009) provide evidence of trade facilitation within ASEAN also reducing the costs of trading with nonmembers. 29 There is, in fact, an emerging arms race in East and South Asia. Between 2007 and 2011, the world's five largest importers of conventional weapons were India, South Korea, China, Pakistan and Singapore (Holtom et al., 2012) . 30 China may have supported the euro by diversifying its stock of reserve assets from US dollars to euros, which helped to limit the fall in value of the euro as the eurozone crisis emerged. However, this was done in China's own interests after the US financial crisis reduced faith in the US dollar. China will not to want to put all its eggs in offers of assistance do not include gifts of cash or loans to an insolvent debtor. Chinese financial support will be channelled through international agencies such as the IMF, accompanied by calls for reforming of voting in the institution. Alternatively, Chinese funds may flow into Europe as direct foreign investment. Neither of these outcomes will be uncontroversial in the EU.
The Significance for Europe of Asia's Economic Rise
The What should be of greater concern to European policymakers is the US embracing of the need to engage in trade facilitating negotiations, as in the TPP, while EU engagement as in, for example, ASEM is feeble. APEC has for two decades been a forum where the major non-European leaders meet, but since the mid-1990s Europeans could take some comfort from APEC's descent into apparent irrelevance (Pomfret, 2011, 27-38) . President G.W.
Bush appeared uninterested in Asia. President Obama has, however, taken steps to reorient US policy towards the Pacific, hosting the 2011 APEC summit in his birth-state, Hawaii.
Even more striking was US participation in the 2011 East Asia summit together with the ASEAN+3, India, Russia, Australia and New Zealand.
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The third element in the US tilt towards the Asia-Pacific region has been its participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations.
a euro basket, especially as the dollar's continuing weigh in China's reserves ensures that China does not want to precipitate a sudden fall in the dollar's value. 31 ASEAN+3 consists of the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations members plus China, Japan and South Korea. Half-hearted EU attempts to be invited to the summit were undermined by substantive concerns about what the EU had to offer and by procedural concerns about how big, and hence disproportionate to its current world role, an EU delegation would be (Parello-Plesner, 2010 
Conclusions Europe's Role in a Multipolar Global Economy
Semantics can be important in political debates and for public perceptions. Europe's self-centred view of an ongoing "global" crisis is even more harmful because it is nurturing a view born in the "GFC" that financial deregulation or liberalization elsewhere brought disaster upon the continental European countries, and that the response must be more regulation, which must be imposed on the entire global financial system, or failing that, on the entire EU. Yet, the reason why the eurozone is still in crisis mode is internal: a mixture of uncertain design of the zone and the role of the ECB, and excessively regulated Schrader and Laaser (2012) argue that Portugal is better placed than Greece because its debt problem is less severe and it had a better diversification and growth strategy after joining the EU in the 1980s, although Portugal slipped up in the 2000s by failing to respond to the challenge of competition from low-wage Eastern European countries. Portugal needs to get back on track, whereas in their view Greece has never been on track since joining the EU.
the role of economic victims, political leaders such as Merkel, Sarkozy and Berlusconi distracted blame from their national governments' past policies, but this stance makes reform harder. 37 The situation is poisoned if re-regulation is adopted as the answer to failure to sufficiently deregulate their economies, and especially the financial sector, in the past.
A second potentially harmful consequence of misperceptions about a GFC and eurozone debt is that European leaders are failing to acknowledge that much of the rest of the world, and especially East Asia, continues to enjoy rapid catch-up growth. Asia weathered the global economic recession of 2008-9 remarkably well. This was partly because no country in East Asia, South Asia or Australasia experienced a financial crisis, and these countries were also well placed to deal with an external trade shock because their economic growth in the twenty-first century had firm foundations. In addition, many countries had built up substantial foreign exchange reserves or sovereign wealth funds, which provided a cushion against balance of payments problems.
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Continued Asian economic growth, as the EU and US faltered, accelerated a decades-long trend of increasing Asian weight in the global economy.
For the global economy, a question posed by the relative success of Asian economies as the USA and western Europe went through major recessions is whether this will be the catalyst for reform of the multilateral economic institutions established over sixty years ago by the World War II victors. Agreements such as the head of the World Bank being from the USA and the head of the IMF being European are clearly anachronistic. The composition of the Gx groups has been a little more malleable, as the G7 expanded to a G8 in the 1990s after Russia abandoned central planning, and was later superseded by the G20, but an arbitrary division between twenty important countries and the unimportant rest of the world is unstable, in Asia as much as anywhere else. 39 Economic reasons for why the potential role of Asia in reform of these institutions for global economic governance has increased are easy to find, but the political constraints within and among Asian countries will impede any clearcut regional leadership in pushing a reform agenda. Given Asia's fissiparous political 37 Similarly the Schadenfreude in some European financial circles when US, UK, Spanish, Irish and other banks encountered difficulties due to their aggressive real estate lending may have made it harder to acknowledge that French and German banks were also guilty of poor lending. Indeed, the loans to delinquent sovereigns who spent on current consumption or wasteful investment (e.g. facilities for the Athens Olympics) may be even worse than the real-estate lending which, in addition to fuelling bubbles, financed some construction of real value in Ireland (new housing) and Spain (infrastructure). 38 Some of the larger regional economies, notably China and Australia, undertook large pre-emptive fiscal stimulus programs. The only serious long-term implication for the national economies is whether those programs can be reversed without significant political disruption before the countries run into sovereign debt issues. 39 Membership of the G7 was on the objective criteria of the market-based economies with the largest GDP, and by chance there was a significant gap between the seventh and eighth ranking. The transition from central planning rendered the criteria obsolete and Russia, but not China, was invited to join the group. By 2012 Brazil also had a higher GDP than Canada, Italy or the UK, but breaks in the ranking list are no longer clear-cut, and can quickly change due to exchange rate or primary product price volatility. The EU is a major player in the world economy and many EU firms are global leaders.
Nevertheless, if the EU is to continue to maintain pre-eminence, its economy needs to move with the times, and policies must be such as to encourage, or at least accommodate, such change. Barbie and the iPhone are useful symbols: the US firms Mattel and Apple have developed products with massive global appeal not by manufacturing those products in the USA but because technically skilled or entrepreneurial workers in the USA have designed and marketed the products, entrusting manufacture to Factory Asia. For EU countries the challenge in the twenty-first century is to ride with dynamic comparative advantage, using their wealth to invest in human capital for future competitiveness.
40
40 A very rough parallel might be drawn with the high-income agricultural exporters of the early 1900s. Canada and Australia made an economic transformation over the twentieth century that included world-beating companies outside the farm sector, while Argentina did not. Whatever the cause of divergence, the point is that high-income countries in the early 2000s may or may not still be high in future global rankings in 2100.
